Bitcoin Without a Hardware Wallet: A Homemade Signer and Seed Backup

Applied protocol under Finance and Wealth in the Wheel of Matter. Branches from Bitcoin Self-Custody: Keys, Backups and Inheritance at its second stage; doctrinal ground at The Sovereign Substrate; the wider tool survey at The Sovereign Stack. See also: Security and Protection, Stewardship.


A hardware wallet is a product sold only to people who hold crypto, and everything that touches it on the way to its owner knows that. The maker’s database, its order processor, the courier, the reseller’s shelf and the maker’s own update server each stand between the holder and the key, and in 2026 alone three of them failed. A holder whose main danger is the person who comes to the door can step out of that chain. Dice the holder rolls make the key. A signer assembled from general-purpose parts, which forgets everything when its power is cut, signs the transactions. Stainless washers from a hardware store hold the backup. Trades that never asked for a name bring in the coins. At no point does a company learn that its customer holds bitcoin, and at no point does a company’s code decide what happens to the key.

Bitcoin Self-Custody: Keys, Backups and Inheritance sets the holder of keys three jobs: keep the secret from everyone, keep it available after the holder is gone, and refuse it to whoever demands it. Its § III chooses a signing device by the maker’s process. For a modest holding this protocol keeps the key on a dedicated phone; for a holding large or visible enough to draw attention, it builds a signer that never touches a network.

I. What a Maker Can Leak

A purchased signer exposes its owner at three points: the customer list, the delivery, and the maker itself.

Ledger has lost its customer list twice. In the summer of 2020 an attacker took a database from its online shop, and in December of that year the file was posted free on a hacking forum: 272,853 customers’ names, postal addresses and phone numbers, and about a million email addresses. Those customers then received extortion emails threatening to come to their homes, and later printed letters sent to their addresses asking for their recovery words. On January 5, 2026 the company confirmed a second exposure, at Global-e, the partner that processed its store orders, with the same fields. No key was touched either time. What leaked was a list of people who hold bitcoin and where they sleep, and Bitcoin Self-Custody § I counts what such a list is worth: Jameson Lopp’s archive held 702 physical attacks on holders by October 2026.

October 2026 reached the delivery. On October 10 Ledger confirmed that a device belonging to one of the users whose wallets had been drained “contained an unauthorized hardware implant.” Researchers who opened tampered Nano X units, Tibane Labs with two bought on Japanese marketplaces and Mark Karpelès with one from Malaysia, found an added board tapped into the screen’s data lines: it read the recovery words as they appeared and sent them out through a cellular modem with an embedded SIM. Early on-chain counts put the thefts above $86 million, and by October 12 the analytics firm Bitquery counted $102 million across 324 wallets. On October 30 Trezor reported a Safe 5, bought in August through the Indonesian marketplace Tokopedia, found with an extra board between the main board and the screen, carrying a cellular module and an antenna; Trezor had not yet examined the unit, and no funds were reported lost. Ledger says every confirmed drain in that wave involved devices sold by CryptoBilis, a distributor in Southeast Asia, and the Trezor came from the same distributor; implanted units have since surfaced through Japanese marketplaces and, by the account of Singapore’s police on October 28, in local retail stores. Ledger says its own channels were unaffected, and Trezor withdraws authorization from part of its dealer network on January 1, 2027.

So a holder who buys direct from the maker avoids the reseller. In May 2023 Ledger announced Ledger Recover, an optional paid service that splits a customer’s recovery words into encrypted shards and sends them to three companies for safekeeping, with identity verification to get them back. Customers learned from the announcement that firmware they already trusted could, at the maker’s choice, be made to export the key. And a maker is only as strong as its least careful employee’s computer. On October 30, 2026 Binance traced the previous day’s theft of about $6.3 billion, the largest on record, to the compromised laptop of one of its DevOps engineers, through which an attacker reached the service that sends withdrawals; TRM Labs attributes the attack with high confidence to the North Korean group TraderTraitor. A company that signs firmware has engineers with laptops too. Whatever a company knows, a breach or an insider can expose, and whatever its update can do, a compromised update can do.

A Raspberry Pi Zero is sold by the million to schoolchildren, hobbyists and factory engineers. No attacker can know which one will hold a key, nobody can intercept a holder’s board without intercepting everyone’s, and no company’s update ever reaches it. Epicurus told his students to live unnoticed, lathe biōsas, and Plutarch wrote a treatise against him for it. For a holder of bitcoin the maxim has become plain security.

The same logic governs how the coins are acquired, and here the leak is usually larger than any delivery label. An exchange that verifies identity holds a file linking a passport to every withdrawal address, and such files have been sold by insiders and stolen by outsiders. A signer built from anonymous parts and funded from an identified account hides the device and publishes the holding. Section 7 brings the coins in by routes that never ask for a name.

II. The Dedicated Phone for Modest Holdings

For most holdings the right device is an old phone given over to bitcoin and nothing else. It answers the leak of section 1 the same way a homemade signer does, because a phone is bought by everyone and marks no one. It also answers the risk Bitcoin Self-Custody § I ranks first, loss by the holder’s own hand: a phone is the setup people actually keep, use and restore from without error.

Its weakness is the app. A wallet on a phone is a company’s code, updated through the company’s channel, on a device that connects to the internet each time it signs. Cake Wallet disclosed in May 2021 that its Bitcoin wallets of the 2020 era had drawn their keys from Dart’s insecure random function, leaving about a million possible keys, and asked its users to move their funds. Kaspersky reported in 2025 that the SparkKitty malware had passed review on both app stores and was scanning photo galleries for pictures of recovery words. So the phone is hardened before it holds anything:

  • A phone that still receives security updates. An old phone past its last patch holding a live key is the weakest arrangement there is. A recent Pixel running GrapheneOS is the strongest phone available for the purpose.
  • Wiped and emptied. Factory reset, no SIM card, no account, no cloud backup, no other app.
  • Off between uses. Wi-Fi comes on to receive or send and goes off again, and the phone lives switched off in a drawer.
  • The app chosen and pinned. Installed from F-Droid or from the project’s own signed release, with automatic updates off. Each update is installed deliberately, after its release notes have been read. The Sovereign Stack surveys the phone wallets: Cake Wallet for Bitcoin and Monero, Gem Wallet where other chains are needed, with the warning that Gem reads the chain through its own servers by default and so can see which addresses belong to whom.
  • A passphrase on top of the words. Drawn by dice, as section 5 describes. A key the app generated badly is then protected by randomness the app never saw, as Coldcard owners with passphrases were protected in July 2026.
  • Words in steel, never on the screen. No screenshot, no photo, no note in another app. The backup is the stamped washers of section 6.

The phone stops being enough when the holding becomes large enough that its loss would change the household’s life, or when its owner becomes visible: known in a town, a company or online to hold bitcoin. From there the key belongs on a device that never touches a network and runs no company’s update: the homemade signer. The phone keeps a role beside the signer, as the wallet for daily amounts.

III. Who Should Not Build Their Own

The homemade path lowers one risk and raises another. Bitcoin Self-Custody § I ranks the risks by what has actually taken bitcoin from holders, and loss by the holder’s own hand comes first, ahead of death without a plan, coercion and device compromise. A commercial device does several jobs on its owner’s behalf: it generates the key, checks the words and walks its owner through the restore. Building at home hands every one of those jobs back, and each one done wrongly is a key lost with no one to call. Keith Mukai, SeedSigner’s lead developer, concedes in his notes on its threat model that it requires much more personal responsibility.

So that article’s § II gate holds here with more force. Its four questions come first: has the holder restored a wallet from its words alone and watched the same address reappear; can they say where two backups would live; does anyone outside the household know what they hold; would anyone in the household know what to do if they died? A holder who has not lived through stage one, a small sum on a phone, wiped and restored at least once, starts there, and a holder whose savings are modest stays with the dedicated phone of section 2.

A further test belongs to this path alone. Can the holder verify a signed file on a computer, typing a command and reading what it prints? The signer’s software arrives as a download, and the only protection against a poisoned download is the holder’s own check. Someone who cannot yet do that check learns it first.

For a small holding none of this is proportionate. The path earns its cost as the holding grows and as its owner becomes more visible.

The signer is SeedSigner, an open-source project that turns a few common parts into an air-gapped Bitcoin signing device. It keeps no key in storage, and it talks to the outside world only through QR codes shown on its screen and read by its camera.

Four parts make it: a Raspberry Pi Zero; a Waveshare 1.3-inch LCD HAT, which must be the 240-by-240-pixel model; a small camera with the OV5647 sensor; and a microSD card. The best board is the Pi Zero version 1.3, which has no Wi-Fi or Bluetooth chip at all. It is now hard to find, sold mostly as retailers’ leftover stock, and every newer Zero carries a radio. A holder who can find a 1.3 takes it. A holder who cannot uses a newer board and should know that the device now contains a radio, which is the one component an air-gapped signer exists to be without. Some boards come without the forty pins the screen plugs into, and soldering them is the only skill the build asks for.

Each part is bought the way a hobbyist buys it, in person where possible, in cash, from more than one shop. A ready-made “SeedSigner kit” from a crypto vendor defeats the purpose: it is a crypto product, with a customer list, shipped to an address.

Assembled, the device is two bare circuit boards and a camera on a ribbon cable. SeedSigner has no secure chip and no physical protection, and Keith Mukai, its lead developer, says plainly that it is unarmed against anyone who gets their hands on it. An implant fitted after assembly to read its screen would defeat it as surely as it defeated the tampered Ledgers. Its defences are of another kind. It forgets the key when its power is cut, so a stolen device holds nothing. Its boards are bare, so an added module has nowhere to hide: the holder photographs both boards on the day of assembly and compares them against that photograph before every session that matters. And the Pi’s own boot firmware cannot be changed, so the one attack surface left is the microSD card, which Mukai names as the place to watch.

The card is written from the project’s own release page, where each image comes with a signed list of checksums. On any computer the holder imports the project’s public key, checks the signature on the list, confirms the key’s fingerprint against the copies the project publishes in several separate places, and checks the image against the list. A signature proves only that whoever holds the project’s key approved the file. Since version 0.7.0 the builds have been reproducible, so anyone can compile the published source and confirm that the result matches the released image byte for byte. Once checked, the image goes onto the card, and the card stays with the device.

V. Generating the Key from Dice

The key is made from randomness the holder can see. In July 2026 keys made on some Coldcard devices since a 2021 build error turned out to rest on a weak software generator, and sweeps beginning July 30 emptied more than 5,200 addresses of about 1,816 bitcoin. Coinkite’s own advice afterwards was that keys made with fifty or more dice rolls were safe. Dice rolled by the holder depend on nobody’s generator.

SeedSigner accepts dice when a new key is created: fifty rolls of a six-sided die for a 12-word key, ninety-nine for a 24-word one, and a holding large enough to justify this path takes the 24-word key. Casino dice with sharp edges are better balanced than the rounded dice of a board game, and each throw has to tumble across the table, not slide; a die that slides lands on the face it started on. Each roll is entered as it falls, and nothing is rolled within sight of a camera, a phone or a window.

From the rolls SeedSigner computes the 24 words, including the last, which carries a checksum and cannot be chosen freely. The project links a guide for confirming that the words follow from the rolls: boot a computer from a live system with its network removed, run a second wallet program on the same rolls, compare, and shut the computer down. A holder who does this has checked the device against an independent calculation. One who skips it has trusted the device, which is the step this whole path exists to remove.

A passphrase follows, as Bitcoin Self-Custody § IV sets out: five or six words drawn by dice from a published wordlist, typed on SeedSigner’s own keyboard and never on a computer. Without it the 24 words open only an empty wallet, and its hazards apply unchanged: there is no reset, and one wrong character opens a different, empty, valid wallet without any warning.

VI. Stamping the Words into Steel

Paper burns, floods and fades, so the backup goes into steel bought from the same kind of shop as the parts.

A set of 3-millimetre letter and number punches, a heavy hammer, a steel block to work on, a few dozen stainless-steel washers, a stainless bolt and a cap nut are everything the holder needs, all sold for ordinary workshop jobs. Bitcoin’s recovery wordlist is built so that the first four letters of each word identify it uniquely. Each washer is stamped with one word’s position and its first four letters, 1 ABAN, 2 TORN and so on through 24, and the numbering matters more than it seems: a washer that slips off the bolt must still know its place. Threaded on in order, the washers are locked by the nut. Jameson Lopp’s stress tests have put dozens of metal backups through about 2,000 °F, a soak in hydrochloric acid and a 20-ton press, and stamped stainless steel is among what comes through legible. Lopp also found stamping the most difficult of all the processes he tested, and the practitioner should plan an evening for it.

Nothing on the bolt names bitcoin, a wallet or a seed. In a drawer of hardware it looks like hardware. The Tibetan Buddhist tradition tells of terma, teachings hidden in rocks, lakes and the fabric of ordinary things, to be recovered when the time is right; a key concealed in a bolt among bolts follows the same logic.

Two bolts are made, and the passphrase is stamped onto a third set that never shares a place with either. Where the three go follows Bitcoin Self-Custody § V: no single place holds enough to spend, and no single loss destroys the means to rebuild.

SeedSigner can also export the key as a SeedQR, a grid filled in by hand on a paper template, which its camera reads back in a second and which saves typing at every session. It is the whole key in a form any phone can read, so it is guarded exactly as the steel is, or never made.

VII. Proving the Key and Bringing Coins In Without a Name

A key is proven before it holds anything, and SeedSigner makes the proof simple, because cutting the power erases it. With the words entered and the passphrase applied, the holder asks for the first receiving address and writes its first six and last six characters on a slip of paper. Then the power is cut. Plugged back in, the device receives the key again from the steel, never from memory or the paper; the holder applies the passphrase and asks for the first address once more. If it matches, the steel is a working key.

Day-to-day use runs through Sparrow Wallet on a computer, preferably connected to the holder’s own node, as The Sovereign Stack describes. SeedSigner shows the wallet’s public description as a QR code and Sparrow reads it; from then on the computer can watch the balance and draft payments but never spend. Each payment is drafted in Sparrow and shown as a QR code. SeedSigner reads it, displays the amount and destination on its own screen for the holder to check, signs, and shows the signed transaction back.

Coins arrive by routes that never collected a name. Peer-to-peer markets built on open protocols, among them Bisq, RoboSats, Peach and Hodl Hodl, match buyers and sellers directly and hold the bitcoin in escrow during the trade, and a buyer on them is not asked for identity. Each carries its own limits, and they change. Since September 2026, under a Swiss regulatory review, Peach caps buy orders at 500 Swiss francs and asks its sellers for identity or a vetted history. Bisq lost 11.59 bitcoin from open altcoin offers to an exploit on May 1, 2026. Larger sums suit an over-the-counter trade with a known counterpart, in person. A holder who already holds dollar stablecoins can swap them for bitcoin on the spot market of a decentralized exchange such as Hyperliquid and withdraw native bitcoin straight to a SeedSigner address; Bitcoin Self-Custody § VI sets out what that route depends on while the coins are in transit, and its rule holds here: the coins stay on the venue for the shortest time the trade allows, and the venue ends the day at zero.

Every deposit goes to a fresh address, and the first payment from any new route is a small test, confirmed on a block explorer and on the device before the rest follows.

VIII. Keeping It and Passing It On

The yearly test of Bitcoin Self-Custody § VIII applies whole, with three additions. Any new SeedSigner release is verified by the same signature and checksum steps before it goes on the card, and the old release can keep running safely, because the device holds nothing between sessions. Both boards are compared against the photograph from the day of assembly. And each bolt is unscrewed and read, washer by washer, against the first address.

That article’s § VII inheritance letter needs one sentence more than usual. Heirs do not need a SeedSigner. The 24 words follow an open standard that almost any Bitcoin wallet accepts, so the letter tells them that the washers carry the first four letters of each word in order, where the passphrase is, and which wallet software to restore into. A board they have never seen is the one thing they will not need.

Nothing in this arrangement asks a company to keep a secret or trusts a company’s update. The dice were the holder’s, the boards could be anyone’s, the software can be checked by anyone with a computer, and the steel was bought for a shelf. What a maker used to do for the holder, the holder now does in about a day’s work and an evening each year. That work belongs to Stewardship, which in the Wheel of Matter means attention given to what is held, and a holding nobody knows about, kept in a form nobody can read as money, frees the attention that fear would otherwise take.


See also: Bitcoin Self-Custody: Keys, Backups and Inheritance, The Sovereign Stack, The Sovereign Substrate, Finance and Wealth, Security and Protection, Stewardship, Wheel of Matter, Cypherpunks and Harmonism, Sovereignty.